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The	Protocol	&	lack	of	consent:	the	British
government	continues	to	gaslight	Northern	Ireland
Katy	Hayward	explains	why	the	British	government	continues	to	gaslight	Northern	Ireland	when	it	comes	to	Brexit.
She	argues	that	London	needs	to	tread	carefully	when	it	comes	to	the	democratic	consent	of	Northern	Ireland.	
The	much-anticipated	(well,	in	some	small	circles)	UK	government	command	paper	on	its	‘Approach	to	the	Northern
Ireland	Protocol’	has	landed.	Along	with	it,	a	statement	by	the	Chancellor	of	the	Duchy	of	Lancaster	in	which	he
managed	the	tricky	task	of	contradicting	and	affirming	the	Prime	Minister’s	comments	on	Protocol.	‘Although	there
will	be	some	new	administrative	requirements	in	the	Protocol’,	he	acknowledged,	‘these	electronic	processes	will	be
streamlined	and	simplified	to	the	maximum	extent’.	As	Gove	told	an	MP	who	recalled	that	Johnson	had	told	NI
businesses	to	throw	Protocol-related	paperwork	in	the	bin:	it	is	all	to	be	done	electronically,	so	‘there	is	no	need	for
bins’.
Even	though	the	command	paper	brings	some	necessary	(if	not	welcome)	confirmation	of	the	implications	of	the
Protocol	(not	least	for	trade	within	the	UK	internal	market),	there	is	a	habit	of	the	British	government’s	approach	to
Northern	Ireland	that	seems	hard	to	shift.	This	is	a	habit	of	gaslighting,	i.e.	deliberately	manipulating	us	into
doubting	our	own	sanity.
It	was	in	evidence	in	Viscount	Younger’s	response	on	behalf	of	the	government	to	the	Ulster	Unionist	Party’s	Lord
Empeyon	Monday:	‘Can	I	be	clear	that	we’ve	always	been	clear	that	there	will	be	requirements	for	live	animal
checks	and	agri-foods	[sic]	building	on	what	already	happens	in	Larne	and	Belfast,	as	the	noble	Lord	will	know.’	Far
from	‘always	being	clear’,	the	position	of	the	UK	government	has	been	so	confusing	that	politicians	from	all	sides
feel	as	though	they	have	been	‘consistently	misled’	on	the	matter.
And	there	is	a	risk	that	it	can	happen	again,	and	to	a	much	more	serious	degree.	In	the	command	paper,	the	UK
government	is	steering	dangerously	close	to	being	deliberately	misleading	on	a	matter	of	grave	importance,	i.e.	the
nature	of	the	Protocol	itself	and	of	the	capacity	of	Northern	Ireland’s	electoral	representatives	to	determine	its
future.	In	an	effort	to	assure	unionists	in	particular,	the	impression	being	given	is	that,	if	they	don’t	like	the	Protocol,
they	can	invest	efforts	into	getting	rid	of	it	via	the	‘democratic	consent’	vote	provided	for	in	Article	18.
The	inclusion	of	Article	18	was	itself	an	effort	to	assuage	concerns	in	Northern	Ireland	(particularly	those	of
unionists)	that	they	would	have	no	say	over	the	Protocol.	Four	years	after	the	end	of	the	transition	period	(and
potentially	every	4	or	8	years	hence),	Northern	Ireland’s	MLAs	will	have	a	vote	on	the	continued	application	of
Articles	5-10	of	the	Protocol,	i.e.	those	relating	in	the	main	to	the	regulation	and	movement	of	goods.	The	process
for	this	vote	has	been	set	out	by	the	UK	government	in	a	Unilateral	Declaration	that	accompanied	the	Protocol.
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This	consent	vote	has	been	given	an	extraordinary	status	in	the	UK	government’s	command	paper.	There	is	a
danger	that	–	even	worse	than	being	fuel	for	the	future	gaslighting	of	Northern	Ireland	(‘we	were	always	clear	it	only
applied	to	six	articles’’’’,	etc.)	–	the	consequences	of	presenting	the	consent	vote	in	the	way	that	it	does	here	are
destabilising	and	entirely	counterproductive	to	the	type	of	‘consensual	and	pragmatic	approach’	the	government
says	it	wishes	to	see.
This	is	exemplified	in	paragraph	4,	which	I	analyse	in	some	detail	here.	It	begins	by	describing	the	Protocol	as	a
‘practical	solution	to	avoiding	a	hard	border	on	the	island	of	Ireland,	whilst	ensuring	that	the	UK…	could	leave	the
EU	as	a	whole’.	It	‘necessarily	included’,	the	paper	states,	‘special	provisions	which	apply	only	in	Northern	Ireland,
for	as	long	as	the	Protocol	is	in	force’	(emphasis	added).
This	is	misleading	in	a	fundamental	way:	the	Protocol	will	never	not	be	in	force;	even	if	there	is	a	‘No	Deal’	at	the
end	of	transition,	the	Protocol	still	stands.	And,	what	is	more,	there	are	many	aspects	of	it	(e.g.	articles	on	the
protection	of	rights,	safeguards,	and	the	Common	Travel	Area)	that	will	apply	regardless	of	how	a	majority	of	MLAs
fall	in	a	future	‘consent	vote’.
Paragraph	4	goes	on	to	state	that	the	special	provisions	for	Northern	Ireland	‘is	why	the	democratic	principle	at	the
heart	of	the	Protocol	is	so	important’.	The	consent	vote	is	a	pretty	miserly	offering	as	far	as	democratic	principles
go.
The	Foreword	to	the	paper	by	Michael	Gove	draws	a	direct	line	of	continuity	between	the	consent	given	to	the	1998
Agreement	and	that	in	the	Protocol.	Consent	to	the	1998	Agreement	came	on	the	basis	of	multiparty	talks	among
elected	representatives	followed	by	a	published	document	that	was	then	subject	to	referendums	in	Northern	Ireland
and	Ireland.	The	Protocol	arises	from	Brexit	(which	was	voted	against	by	the	majority	of	people	in	Northern	Ireland)
and	from	a	compromise	which	was	negotiated	at	the	highest	levels,	voted	against	by	all	Northern	Ireland’s	MPs
when	ratified	by	the	UK	Parliament	in	an	Act	for	which	consent	was	withheld	by	the	Northern	Ireland	Assembly.	It	is
hardly	comparable.
That	is	not	to	say	that	it	is	not	important	for	the	implementation	of	the	Protocol	to	have	the	‘broadest	possible
support	across	the	community’	–	of	course	it	is.	But	this	support	is	best	fostered	and	created	through	proper	and
meaningful	democratic	scrutiny,	representation	and	legitimacy.	The	consent	vote	is	no	substitute	for	that.
Colleagues	and	I	have	recently	written	a	report	on	this	topic,	and	make	some	recommendations	as	to	how	to
address	this	democratic	deficit	for	Northern	Ireland.	The	way	that	the	UK	Government	has	framed	the	consent	vote
in	this	paper	only	diminishes	the	chances	of	the	Protocol	commanding	support	across	Northern	Ireland.
Encouraging	the	delusion	that	the	fate	of	the	Protocol	lies	in	the	hands	of	Northern	Ireland,	Paragraph	4	continues:
“The	Protocol	is	not	codified	as	a	permanent	solution;	it	is	designed	to	solve	a	particular	set	of	problems	and	it	can
only	do	this	as	long	as	it	has	the	consent	of	the	people	of	Northern	Ireland.	That	is	why	it	is	for	the	elected
institutions	in	Northern	Ireland	[i.e.	the	Assembly]	to	decide	what	happens	to	the	Protocol	alignment	provisions	in	a
consent	vote	that	can	take	place	every	four	years.”
Far	from	‘determin[ing]	the	way	forward	in	the	longer	term’	(as	claimed	in	paragraph	14	of	the	paper),	if	MLAs	vote
to	align	to	UK	rules,	it	will	be	for	the	UK-EU	Joint	Committee	to	decide	what	happens	for	NI	trade	with	EU	and	with
GB,	i.e.	on	NI’s	land	and	sea	borders.	This	would	be	to	hand	the	biggest	decisions	about	NI’s	economy	back	into
the	hands	of	an	unelected	body	which	only	needs	to	meet	once	a	year	and	which	does	not	need	to	publish	its
agenda	or	its	minutes.	And	to	which	NI	Executive	would	only	be	invited	to	attend	as	observers.	Hardly	a	democratic
coup.
In	the	meantime,	the	UK	government	is	encouraging	the	belief	that	MLAs	and	voters	have	the	capacity	to	see	the
end	of	the	Protocol:	‘Only	elections	in	Northern	Ireland	and	the	vote	of	the	Assembly	will	decide	the	outcome’.	Not
only	is	this	untrue	(as	discussed),	this	is	dangerous.	The	presumption	is	that	unionists	will	lead	the	charge	on	this,
in	order	to	defend	the	Union;	with	nationalists	defending	the	open	Irish	border.	There	was	always	a	risk	of	the
consent	vote	being	a	proxy	‘border	poll’.	Now	it	is	being	used	to	raise	the	stakes	even	higher	in	every	Assembly
election.
Meantime,	the	real-world	challenges	of	the	Protocol	and	of	Brexit	will	need	to	be	faced	and	addressed	by	those
same	elected	representatives.	And	this	can	only	be	done	on	a	collaborative,	cooperative	basis.
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As	for	the	UK	government,	the	fundamental	question	remains,	more	pressing	than	ever:	What	will	it	do	to	ensure
that	the	democratic	principle	really	is	at	the	heart	of	its	approach	to	the	Protocol	and,	indeed,	to	Northern	Ireland.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	
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